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C O N F E R E N C E   R E P O R T

WILTON PARK CONFERENCE NO. 264: 8 - 14 APRIL 1984  
THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE,  
SOCIAL INJUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The Wilton Park rule is that everything said is strictly off-the-record. This report therefore makes no attribution of ideas or views to individual conference members or speakers. It is the co-ordinator's purely personal impression of the work of the conference, is not official and does not claim to be exhaustive. The order is thematic and not that of the programme.

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## INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE

1. The growth of violence in the 1970s has made discussion of law and order issues an urgent priority. The conference examined three kinds of violence: street violence, terrorism, and the seemingly apolitical violence of football hooliganism. Whatever the kind of violence, there was agreement among participants that the 1970s and 1980s had witnessed a sharpening of social conflict and a growing threat to democracy. The purpose of the conference was to examine causes, consequences and remedies, to assess the degree to which the struggle for social justice and human rights were causes of violence and whether such violence could be explained and justified.

## PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND METHOD

2. Before analysing case studies of violence, the conference discussed whether there could ever be a justification for political violence and how one could adequately define the issue under examination.

### A Justification for Violence

3. Terrorists argue that a non-violent transfer of power from the privileged classes to the disadvantaged is inconceivable. To this assumption is added the view that liberal democracy is a sham and that radical thought and politicians are marginalised and trivialised by the holders of power and the media. The conference agreed that violence had been necessary to overthrow feudalism but disagreed with the view that there were relevant parallels between feudalism and modern European industrialism.

4. There was much discussion of covert forms of violence, sometimes referred to as 'structural violence'. It was agreed that there remained unacceptable inequalities of access to life chances both within the developed world and between the developed and underdeveloped world. However, the fact that seekers of change do not manage to gain power within the system was insufficient grounds to justify violence, if a society fulfilled certain democratic criteria such as the uncoerced selection of rulers, and the ability subsequently to influence their policies. The example of modern France was cited as a case where the political left could achieve a redistribution of wealth without recourse to violence.

### Defining Violence and Political Violence

5. The looseness with which the term 'violence' is often employed led to a debate about the semantics involved. It was felt by some participants that, say, the seeming inability of the National Health Service to cure certain people in a manifestly rich society could not justifiably be called 'violence', since inherent in the definition of violence was the notion of force. Since much of the debate

rested on assumptions about equality and inequality the conference spent time discussing the relativity of these concepts. There might well be a case for inequality if it could be demonstrated that inequality in one area leads to a greater access of all to society's benefits.

6. The example of South Africa was cited in this context. South Africa might not approximate an ideal definition of democracy in terms of majority access to power and decision-making, but white South Africans would probably argue that the present system produces better results for non-whites than conceivable practical alternatives. One could, it was argued, class political acts as democratic if their consequences tended towards the criteria of democracy. This view brought the conference back to the notion of democratic violence; that is, violence perpetrated with the intention of achieving more democracy. But the previous arguments about the nature of democracy and its provision of compromise without coercion undermined this justification. What differentiated ordinary violence from political violence? The definition of political violence provided to the conference by Ted Honderich was

"a considerable or destroying use of force against persons or things, a use of force prohibited by law, directed to a change in the policies, personnel or system of government, and hence also directed to changes in the existence of individuals in society and perhaps in other societies."

## FOOTBALL VIOLENCE

### Two Political Implications

7. Many participants failed to see the relevance of football hooliganism in a conference primarily dedicated to the study of political violence. However, since the conference was focussed on the relationship between social injustice and violence, it was argued that just as inner city riots are a manifestation of a deep social malaise reflecting perceived social injustice, so football hooliganism could prove to be social protest, not directed at political institutions but at a surrogate foe, the supporters of the opposing team. Moreover, the right-wing National Front in the UK is on record as welcoming the opportunity of motivating the hooligans with the political aims of aggressive nationalism. The individual's emotional commitment to an abstract cause, the football club, is apparently as exploitable politically as patriotism, religion or ideology.

### Causes and Solutions

8. The conference discussed several myths about football violence, which did not start in the 1960s but can be traced back to the nineteenth century. It is also not only a British phenomenon, but is rife in countries such as Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. While the British example is perhaps the worst in Europe, greater excesses have been recorded in Peru, Argentina and the Soviet Union. Football

hooligans are deprived and frustrated working-class youths trying to achieve through ritualised protest the status and respect they cannot find through more normal social activity. The causes lie in the social and economic environment and the failure of society to provide a framework of motivation. The media have amplified the phenomenon by providing publicity and creating anti-heroes. Publicity is a means by which an otherwise anonymous, often pathetic, existence can bathe in a brief moment of glory.

9. Better policing has proved effective in Britain in curbing the violence, but there is a growing displacement of disorder to football clubs where the police are not yet prepared, and also abroad. Football hooliganism has thus become an international phenomenon. More collaboration between national police forces may be part of the solution, but if the roots of the problem are economic and social it is unfair to expect the police to deal with the consequences of society's inability to provide a remedy to the underlying conditions. This theme was addressed again in discussions with police officers during the conference visit to Brixton, London.

#### SOCIAL UNREST AND STREET RIOTS

##### The Economic and Social Background

10. Whether justified or not, social inequality is the reason for the growing violence in the inner-cities. In order to gain first-hand experience of what social injustice means, the conference visited the London Borough of Lambeth. In Lambeth more than half the population receive some form of government assistance. There is high unemployment in general and a particular concentration in the young and the black community. Much of the housing is sub-standard and there is a history of tense relations between the immigrant community and the local police. In April 1981 Brixton was the scene of the most violent civil disturbances this century. A subsequent report by Lord Scarman <sup>(1)</sup> underlined the direct link between the violence and the tension in relations between the black community and the police. The report also criticised the media for amplifying the phenomenon and arguably leading to its spread to other parts of the country. The report made several recommendations on policing methods which are discussed below.

11. Tours and discussions took place in which white and black leaders explained various schemes such as the 'inner-city partnership' aimed at coping with the root causes of social conflict, namely: unemployment, and lack of education. The conference was struck by the determination and optimism of local council workers, managers and workers. It was repeatedly stressed that funds for social and economic

/improvement

(1) The Scarman Report on The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 (HMSO 1981)

improvement needed to be adequate, but that these would only be beneficial if the projects themselves were well-conceived and executed. Some despondency was expressed over the failure of trainees to find jobs at the end of their courses, since there were simply no jobs available.

#### Policing the Streets

12. The concept of 'neighbourhood policing' was discussed by members of the local police force and representatives of the Lambeth Police Liaison Committee, an organisation set up by Lambeth Council to monitor the state of relations between police and public and give a framework to the endeavour to create a fruitful dialogue. If the police became members of the local community and were well known to the local personalities, it was argued, a climate of mutual trust could be restored and the 'alienation by default' of previous years could be reversed. Worry was expressed, however, that recent moves to control the police by democratically elected local committees could prove the thin end of a wedge destined to politicise the police and remove the existing autonomy of the chief constables.

13. 'Neighbourhood policing' has been re-introduced since it has been realised that the trend away from foot patrols has damaged the climate of trust and friendship between the local police and the public. The rising street crime rates in Lambeth had forced the police into a reactive posture rather than allowing them to act constructively to prevent crime and assist the victims. Naturally, with the new emphasis on the foot patrol officer mobile policing is at a lower level, but adequately trained and equipped capacity is retained for both response to routine and serious emergencies.

14. There has been a review of some aspects of the training police officers receive, and awareness of the community's needs is now a major feature of training programmes. The policeman often has an entirely different background and experience from the people he will encounter on the beat and appreciation of and insight into the problems and perceptions of the public, particularly in multi-racial areas, are vital. Lord Scarman's report stressed the specificity of the black culture and the police have therefore introduced methods of ensuring that differing life styles and attitudes to society on the part of black people are not allowed to become grounds for grievance and a potential source of disturbance. These new policies of training police officers in community awareness have had good results, as shown by the statistics.

15. The conference discussed the coincidence of a high concentration of immigrants and high levels of unemployment and crime. It was easy to understand how an association could be formed in the public mind between being black and being unemployed and criminal. The violence experienced in the inner-cities of the UK had been concentrated

in areas where the percentage of black immigrants was high. It was difficult to measure how much of the problem was attributable to different styles of life, and how much crime levels were a function of high unemployment rates and the apparent inability of the black population to find acceptance in a predominantly white society.

#### Central and Local Government

16. The problems facing large inner-city boroughs such as Lambeth were outlined. Conflict between central and local government, it was asserted, was usually positive in its effects, since compromise could be creative. However, a particularly divisive conflict exists at the present time between Conservative central government and Labour controlled boroughs such as Lambeth. The clash is between the attempt to implement social policies entailing expenditure above available resources and mandatory restrictions imposed on local council expenditures by central government.

#### TERRORISM

##### The Psychological Profile of the Terrorist

17. The conference discussed first some common psychological features of the terrorist mentality before passing to a closer study of France and Northern Ireland. Present-day terrorism is an urban phenomenon with roots in the rural guerilla strategies developed amongst others by Mao Tse Tung. The effect on the innocent and observers is intended to be equal to or superior to the damage actually inflicted on the foe. The importance of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the consequences of the act in terms of the long-term political aims of the terrorist group. The growing resort to terrorist tactics is partially linked to the growth in sophistication of technology and the concomitant rise in the vulnerability of society.

18. Is there a common psychological background to the various types of terrorism? Some argued that the basic problem was the alienation of many young people from modern society. They feel that society and the state are repressive, yet realise also that the welfare state provides them with many benefits. There might thus be a subconscious individual conflict based on the contradiction between reliance on society on the one hand and total rejection of it on the other. Added to particular kinds of group characteristics, individual opposition to the norms of society can become violent conflict.

19. The group characteristics concerned derive from the fact that modern mass society is a world of establishments versus counter-cultures. The solidarity of members of counter-cultures (often small alienated groups) is strengthened by

the isolation produced by mutual disapproval between the establishment and themselves. Criticism from without is never seen as constructive and the critical faculties of members of these small groups are often used only in internal debate or in debate with rival groups. There is thus a process of hardening and exclusion, which often results in rivalry between terrorist groups attempting to be the most aggressive.

20. Naturally, not all counter-cultures cause physical harm. It would be ridiculous to suppose that opposition to society should be equated with the will to destroy society physically. The transition from the harmless to the harmful group usually requires adherence to a closed ideology or abstract ideal such as nationalism, religion or revolution.

21. Usually, natural human aggression is tamed by social norms. What changes in the case of the terrorist is the subordination of the individual to the group ideal. Individual responsibility to society can be abdicated in favour of the group personality and its often aggressive ideology. Then anti-social acts take on a quasi-mystical aura and the harmless individual becomes prepared to accept political violence 'for the greater good'. This explains the propensity to strike from afar by letter bomb or timing device, rather than to kill in person.

22. Mysticism and ritual are thus common features between terrorists and football hooligans. Their violent acts are a manifestation of deep mistrust and rejection of the prevailing social norms. While the terrorist act is 'justified' by rejection of the established system, the violence of the football fan is less articulate, since unwedded to ideology, and not directed at the state but at a surrogate foe, the opposing team's supporters.

#### Implications for Anti-Terrorist Strategy

23. The conference discussed the possibility of dealing with, say, a hostage situation, by encouraging the terrorists to return from his submergence in the group mentality to his individual conscience. By spinning out negotiations, developing a rapport between captor and victim, and possible expression by the victim of sympathy with the captor's cause rather than his methods, the conflict between individual conscience and the ideology of the group could become intolerable, and compromise thus become possible.

24. Another interesting feature of terrorist psychology is the readiness to stop terroristic activity if a degree of respect or recognition is shown by the other side. The PLO might be cited as an example of a change from terrorism to dialogue, though not all of the Palestinian sub-groups had accepted the principle of dialogue. It is also important to recognise that individual terrorists differ greatly in their



personal motivation to violence. While some individuals have a fanatical dedication to a cause, others clearly use this cause to obtain personal power and recognition. Discovering the personalities involved in a particular terrorist act is thus essential in finding the correct response.

25. Finally, the typical terrorist is often only the instrument of an organisation, a romantic idealist manipulated by professional agents, and indeed often by states. It was felt important to define terrorism with official state backing as a continuation of war by other means. An estimated one quarter of all international terrorist acts in 1983 were known to have support from states.

### Two Case Studies

#### A. Terrorism in France

26. In discussing terrorism in France, the vital theme was stressed of the necessity for democracy to combat terrorism if it is to survive. There is evidence to show that national and particularly international terrorism on French soil have seriously jeopardised the legitimacy of the democratic process. Historically, of course, human rights were born out of the terror of the French Revolution. There is thus a national psychological contradiction between the legitimacy of the French Revolution and the belief in the illegitimacy of a similar process today.

27. The French State has borne the brunt of the rising problem of terrorism. France offers political asylum to the oppressed, but the price is encouragement to terrorist groups from abroad to commit violent acts against their foes on French territory. French citizens are often innocent victims of such terrorist acts. In turn this leads to calls by the public and the police for an increase in the severity of punishment and indeed the death penalty for terrorist offences.

28. So far as domestic terrorism is concerned there has been no parallel phenomenon in France to the Red Brigades and Baader Meinhoff in Italy and Germany. The political system has seemed capable of assimilating the opposition of the potentially extremist movements of left and right. While the recent trend to racism in France, and the rise of the far right in the polls is disconcerting, one cannot point to terrorist violence as a method of French extremism, except in the case of Corsican nationalism. Even in this case it is property rather than people which is subject to attack.

29. Terrorism is now a factor of international political life and the emergence of state terrorism conducted on foreign soil has led to a new category of war. France, it was argued, was too often the battlefield for such new forms of war, though the asylum principle also made France a good gathering ground for information

in the campaign against terrorism. The conference debated evidence that much international terrorism was financed by the Soviet Union. However, the point was also made that both the super-powers probably finance organisations liable to cause disruption or dissent in areas outside their own spheres of influence. It was interesting to note that co-operation between governments over terrorism was often less successful than the co-operation of terrorist groups themselves across national frontiers. Basque nationalists live quite comfortably, after all, in France, though there have been recent moves to prevent them setting up bases in frontier areas. The Basques, however, are a potentially strong electoral force and a cogent argument was made to the effect that Spanish governments have not identified the real roots of the Basque problem. Other Western countries were discussed in a similar context. There was much that Western countries could do, not least in Latin America, to ensure that the breeding grounds for terrorism were less fertile.

#### B. Northern Ireland: terrorism in a permissive framework

30. The distinguishing feature of the terrorism of Protestants and Catholics alike in Northern Ireland is the fundamental agreement of the Protestant and Catholic populations with the aims of the terrorists, if not with the means. The problem for law enforcement is thus the consensus on aims and the tight community bases from which the terrorists operate.

31. The conference discussed the origins of the problem in Northern Ireland as fundamentally lying in a clash between four separate though interlinked cultures: the English, Anglo-Irish, Gaelic and Ulster Protestant. The peoples in the conflict identify with customs and social practices and share systems of belief with the other members of their culture. Culture, in this sense, is something for which deep personal sacrifices are made. The dominance of one of the cultures over the other in the same territory, and the consequent threat to the continued existence of the dominated culture, may produce in the 'dominated' a sense of inadequacy and humiliation liable to spill over into hatred and violence. While the Anglo-Irish identity is no longer a factor in the present situation in Northern Ireland, it has played a considerable historical role. The Gaelic culture is based on the Irish language and traditions. It is nationalist in politics and Catholic in religion. It is perhaps best described as Catholic-Nationalist. The Ulster Protestant identity has its roots in post-reformation English and Scottish settlements in the North of Ireland. It is Unionist in politics and pro-British in sympathies. Finally, there is the English culture, equated primarily with the exercise of British constitutional, economic and military power in Northern Ireland.

32. Politically, the Catholic Nationalist identity favours a united Ireland and is reflected in the government and opposition parties (Fine Gael and Fianna Fail) in the

Irish Republic, the Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland and the Republican Sinn Fein. This does not, of course, imply that all Catholics necessarily adhere to this position. The Ulster Protestant supports the union of Northern Ireland with Great Britain but would prefer Northern Ireland independence to incorporation into a united Ireland under Catholic Nationalist hegemony. The British government position is that Northern Ireland must remain British as long as a majority of the population desires it.

33. The roots of the conflict are thus historical and cultural. Resolution of the conflict by compromise seems ruled out, since the aims of the two major cultural groups are mutually exclusive. This stalemate, harbouring as it does a feeling on the part of the Catholic Nationalists of exploitation by the Protestant majority, has been variously recognised as the cause of violence and disturbance. The conflict is not simply religious, but a dangerous mix of power, politics and religion, with religion providing the abstract ideal for a political struggle for economic and social power.

34. The search for a resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland is thus faced with the contradiction that resolution can only be based on compromise, yet compromise demands face-to-face contact hitherto believed to be unacceptable. If the Catholic nationalist demand for the withdrawal of the British is as strong as the Protestant refusal to countenance co-operation, it may be necessary for the British Government to discuss the problems of co-existence with both terrorist leaders and the Irish Government despite opposition from the Protestants and the Northern Ireland Office. Deadlock and the continuation of violence may be the only alternative.

35. The conference drew two lessons from the case of Northern Ireland. First, while the principle of refusal to negotiate with terrorists was still supported, there seemed to be agreement among those not directly involved in the conflict that the growth of electoral support for the Sinn Fein candidate, Gerry Adams, made the refusal to talk a potential subversion of democracy. There seemed, therefore, to be an exception to the non-negotiation principle, and comparisons were made between Adams and previous Irish freedom-fighters/terrorists such as de Valera and Collins. Second, the cost of failure to act is increasingly high both economically (UK government spending in Northern Ireland accounts for 70 per cent of Northern Irish GDP as opposed to 41 per cent in the UK as a whole), and in terms of lives and political good will towards Britain both in Ireland and abroad.

36. However, the conference also debated a variety of questions related to such a view. Was movement impossible because no statesman dared to take risky initiatives? Did the power to solve the problem lie in Dublin and London, and not in Northern Ireland itself? Should the Protestant and Catholic Churches not offer a de-tribalised ecumenical compromise? What was the responsibility and indeed the role of the media in reporting the conflict and bringing about a solution? Could there really be a political solution when improved political rights for one cultural community might result in persecution of a new minority?

37. Finally, it was agreed that the forces of law and order must rely on support from the community. But where, as in Northern Ireland, the community is divided into conflicting cultural identities, support for the police and the army often seems to imply supporting one side against the other. There can therefore be no blind assertion of authority and in the final analysis successful policing must be underpinned by encouragement to those who oppose violence to oppose it more effectively.

#### PATHWAYS OUT OF TERRORISM

##### The Terrorist in Prison

38. Linking with the psychological analysis earlier in the conference, a session was devoted to the study of the implications for terrorist groups of having some of their members imprisoned, and the further implications for the functioning of the prison service in having prisoners deserving special status and treatment.

39. The response of terrorist offenders is clearly a function of the treatment they receive. While the basic assumption of the prison service might be that a liberal prison regime creates the conditions for harmony within individual prisons, there is a steadily growing public demand for harsher treatment of terrorist offenders. This demand has increased throughout the 1970s as a result of the rise in terrorist offences.

40. There can, of course, be no special treatment for terrorists, as there would be for prisoners of war. As such, the terrorist must be considered in the same light as any other minority requesting special treatment on grounds of special status. A further important feature is that while the terrorist prisoner is usually the perpetrator of the offence, he is not always the organiser. It was noted earlier in the conference that a major factor in the psychology of the terrorist was the feeling of belonging to a closely knit group with a strong inward-looking ideology. Now, it is a commonplace that stability is afforded by sub-groups which form within prisons. However, while this may be true for ordinary offenders, in the case of terrorists the state has every interest in dispersing individuals and not allowing groups to subsist.

The fundamental difference between the ordinary criminal and the terrorist is that the terrorist retains his basic political goals. The command structure of the terrorist organisation is often retained in the prison setting. It is thus, for example, most important for the prison authorities to identify the IRA commander within the prison, for with the subsistence of the organisation comes influence of various kinds on other prisoners with more or less nefarious consequences. It is therefore vital to monitor the terrorist sub-group in order to transfer potentially troublesome elements, and prevent prisons becoming training bases for terrorist groups. The problem for the prison authorities is the tension between the need to ensure discipline faced with a recalcitrance uncommon in ordinary criminals, and the need at the same time to maintain respect for human rights. While misbehaviour on the part of terrorists who have themselves not respected human rights often demands the removal of privileges and segregation, the latter is only possible for a few days without contravention of the European Convention on Human Rights.

41. Finally, it was accepted that imprisonment of terrorists certainly does not mean the end of their active links with terrorist organisations, nor that they abandon their political objectives. On the contrary, imprisonment can become a form of martyrdom and have consequences entirely contradictory to the original aim.

#### The Option of Containment

42. The basic method of defending democratic society is to preserve the rule of law. Terrorism has been almost eradicated without serious hindrance to this aim in Italy, Canada and West Germany where there has been a marked decrease in terrorist activity since 1983. It is not totally unrealistic, however, to assume that the defence of democracy entails a cost to democracy by a temporary dilution of democratic principles. There are examples where democracy has been totally suspended and where military power has seemed the only alternative to anarchy. The conference agreed that methods had to be found of combatting terrorism without recourse to methods that would fundamentally jeopardise the very society to be preserved.

43. In the absence of a political settlement the issue is how to contain terrorism. Various recommendations to this end were discussed. The unpalatable fact was that terrorism often succeeded and that grievances were sometimes only recognised after being violently brought to public attention. However, the success of Sinn Fein in the polls in Northern Ireland was an example showing that violence was not the only answer. Great sympathy was expressed with a recommendation to resist tyranny by strengthening democracy itself. Participants were in no doubt about the need

to encourage openness in the police, and to match public debate about violence with increased co-operation between the police, the media and the public.

44. Institutionally, task forces such as the SAS, the use of intelligence services, signing international anti-terrorist agreements and using them to bring terrorists to trial are all ways in which terrorism can be combatted. All too often commitment to international co-operation remains vague and difficult to implement in practice. It has proved impossible for example to stem the flow of arms reaching terrorists in Northern Ireland and elsewhere.

45. Finally, however, solution lies in the political will of both governments and peoples. In countries with a sound democratic system firm policies over the past few years have won the battle against illegal violence for political ends.

#### CONCLUSION: HUMAN RIGHTS

46. The human rights theme was ever present in the discussion about the origins of all three types of violence analysed during the conference. Arguments for democracy, for fair treatment in prison, for greater social justice in deprived inner-city areas, were all arguments in favour of the rights and dignity of man. However, a clear distinction was made between fundamental human rights and 'material rights' such as the right to work or to receive social benefits. There was discussion about the need sometimes to give up rights for the sake of the wider collective good, and contrasts were remarked between the positive social effects self-abnegation could have, and the negative consequences of bitterly fighting for an 'ideal' in ways which detracted from other people's rights.

47. One problem for the churches, particularly in the Third World, is that unsavoury methods are often used in pursuance of goals the church would applaud. Freedom fighters for a Christian cause often seek guidance from the church. It is difficult for the comfortable Westerner to comprehend the dilemma of the church in an under-privileged world. A possible parallel in the West would be with the office holder obliged to implement a policy with which he disagrees. Should he stay to improve things or leave in protest? In the throes of social change there is a danger that people are left in limbo between collective and individual rights. The role of the committed liberal, as indeed of the church, is to speak out in defence of human rights and to take a stand against abuse. This was, in fact, a major theme of the conference.

48. Those who have direct dealings with the perpetrators of violence, the police, the prison officers and the lawyers, were all in accord that it is essential to be absolutely scrupulous in defending the human rights not only of political activists but of the terrorists themselves. Any sanctions against them should take place only in the strictest

accordance with the rule of law. Failure to follow this precept would be to endanger the very principles and values we want to preserve. The members of the conference came to it already believing this, but they departed in even greater conviction that there could be no alternative.

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PROGRAMME OF SESSIONS

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Nicholas Scott MBE JP MP  
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State  
for Northern Ireland and  
Conservative Member of Parliament  
for Chelsea

OPENING SESSION: VIOLENCE FOR EQUALITY?

FRANCE, TERRE D'ASILE

FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM: WANTON,  
MEANINGLESS VIOLENCE?

TERRORISM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE

HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER INCREASING THREAT

THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN  
IRELAND

POLICING VIOLENCE: SOME OPERATIONAL  
DISTINCTIONS

TERRORIST OFFENDERS IN PRISON

PATHWAYS OUT OF TERRORISM

CLOSING SESSION



PARTICIPANTS

Lisbeth Aepli	Headteacher of Zurcher Oberland Cantonal Grammar School, Dubendorf.
Martine Baranger	Ministry of External Relations, Paris.
Thomas B Beattie	Control Risks Limited, London.
Andres F Cassinello Perez	Directorate General of Guardia Civil, Madrid.
Ismail Cem	"Gunes" (daily newspaper), Istanbul.
Jan Czaja	ZSL (United Peasants' Party), Warsaw.
George (Tim) Davidson Smith	Leutenant-Colonel, Army; currently postgraduate research student, Aberdeen University.
George R De Muth	C S Mott Children's Hospital, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Fernand Diederich	Luxembourg Police.
Rudolf Erlbacher	Federal Ministry of the Interior, Vienna.
Maja D Fischer	Zurcher Oberland Cantonal Grammar School, Dusseldorf.
Alan C Goodison	HM Ambassador to Republic of Ireland.
Sven Fredrik Hedin	Swedish Ambassador to Portugal.
Andreas H Huber	St Gallen Graduate School of Economics, Law, Business and Public Administration.
Pontus F Jarborg	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.
Hans-Carl von Jordans	Federal Government Press and Information Office, Bonn.
Fernand Kirch	Ministry of Public Security Forces, Luxembourg.
Irene Maier	Federal Ministry of Justice, Bonn.
Patrick G McCaughey	West Midlands Police, Birmingham.
Terence H F McCulloch	Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd, Cape Town.
Mrs Moira McCulloch	Training Consultant, Cape Town.
Dirk Mulder	Ministry of Justice, The Hague.
Ulf Norstrom	Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.
Tansu Okandan	NATO Defense College, Rome.
Raymond J-M Petit	Prime Minister's Office, Luxembourg.
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